RICHARD JAGGASAR

IN THE ever-evolving landscape of constitutional law, a matter of significant consequence has arisen concerning the potential use of section 76(4) of the TT Constitution. This provision presents a clear pathway for a virtually unprecedented transfer of executive authority, one that could circumvent the democratic will of the people.

To appreciate the gravity of this issue, it is necessary to first set out the relevant constitutional framework. Section 76(1) of the Constitution states:

"Where there is occasion for the appointment of a prime minister, the President shall appoint as prime minister –

"(a) a member of the House of Representatives who is the Leader in the House of the party which commands the support of the majority of members of that House; or

"(b) where it appears to the President that the party which commanded the support of the majority of members of the House of Representatives before the dissolution of Parliament no longer commands such support, a member of the House of Representatives who, in his judgement, is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of that House."

This provision enshrines the fundamental democratic principle that the electorate determine, through their parliamentary representatives, who will be appointed as prime minister. It is in keeping with this principle that the People’s National Movement (PNM) elected Keith Rowley as their political leader, fully expecting that, upon securing a parliamentary majority, he would rightfully assume the role of prime minister.

However, it is now foreseeable that the government may invoke section 76(4), which states:

"Where at any time between the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of a prime minister in accordance with subsection (1) there is no prime minister or the prime minister is unable to perform the functions of his office, the President may appoint some other minister to perform those functions."

By its plain wording, this provision allows for the appointment of any existing minister to act as prime minister in the interim period following the dissolution of Parliament. The concern, however, lies in the way this may be manipulated to bypass the electorate’s will.

All signs point to the dissolution of Parliament in the coming weeks if not days. Once Parliament is dissolved the writ of election will be issued by the President and that election date can be no later than three months from the dissolution of Parliament.

If, as anticipated, Dr Rowley advises the President to dissolve Parliament and then resigns, section 76(4) would be triggered. With no sitting Parliament, there would be no "Leader in the House," thereby eliminating the possibility of a successor being appointed under section 76(1).

Instead, the selection of an interim (a term I use for ease of reference) prime minister would be dictated by the composition of the Cabinet, leaving the President with little discretion but to appoint a candidate endorsed by this closed circle of political elites.

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