Annually, as the hurricane season comes around and the dry season changes to the wet, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management (ODPM) has come to expect the re-emergence of one or two self-appointed "disaster experts," making baseless criticisms having done no research.
This article aims first, to refute similar baseless statements and innuendos that were made in an opinion-piece published in Trinidad Guardian on October 8 –Waiting for the ODPM. In that article, the writer attempted to present as fact, his/her perceptions of what the ODPM’s role ought to have been, during and following the passage of tropical wave Invest 91L.
However, the main purpose of this article, is to provide the reader with an insight into the ODPM’s operations and how, working in tandem with other agencies, an integrated approach was taken to manage the response effort and bring relief to citizens.
Disaster "experts" and tunnelled-vision
The passage of Invest 91L resulted in flooding and landslides mainly in three of the 14 municipal corporations – Tunapuna/Piarco, Sangre Grande and Chaguanas – and in seven communities of Tobago.
Being a localised event, in Trinidad, the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government would have been responsible for responding to the deluge, while in Tobago, responsibility would have fallen to the Tobago House of Assembly (THA).
Finding this approach inadequate, the "expert’s" innovative solution for managing the complexities involved in last week’s crisis lay in one principal strategy. The deployment of all the ODPM’s staff into the field to provide “boots on the ground,” so that they would be working “shoulder-to-shoulder with regional corporations (sic) employees.”
Consequently, with its current staff complement of 30-odd people, the ODPM would have provided the magic bullet, which would have relieved our citizens of their distress in the fastest possible way. This, despite the combined strength of the 14 municipal corporations and the THA numbering in the thousands.
Of course, this overly simplistic solution if followed had severe implications for the nation. First, from an operational perspective, the National Disaster Office would have abandoned all of its ongoing national and regional responsibilities. Second, no consideration would have been given to the ODPM’s responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of the response and support agencies. Neither it seems that any thought was given to the office’s data collection and analytical capabilities, nor its ability to generate and share solutions with agencies. This was particularly critical, given the uncertain and dynamic situation the country was facing at the time.
Strategically, it seems that our tunnelled-vision "expert" also did not give any consideration whatsoever for the ODPM to maintain its responsibility of scoping the landscape for associated cascading effects, nor emerging threats to the nation.
The writer linked his recommendations to rather unfortunate statements expressed that week by the MP for Bar
