As we head into election year, the political pot could not be more heated - one sizzling political controversy after another, some with serious constitutional and judicial implications.

The regularly-headlined 'missing money and documentation' controversy between Auditor General Jaiwantie Ramdass, Minister of Finance Colm Imbert and Attorney General Reginald Armour, SC, will likely test the Constitution. Health Minister Terrence Deyalsingh may welcome the breathing space.

Last Wednesday evening, while listening to AG Armour commenting on the controversy in a televised interview, the person next to me asked: 'Is he independent?' Just three words but with firecracker impact.

I cautiously replied, 'It depends on whom you ask.' But indeed, it is a billion-dollar question linked to Section 4 of the Constitution where our rights and freedoms are proudly listed.

The Constitution states: 'The Attorney General shall, subject to section 79, be responsible for the administration of legal affairs in TT and legal proceedings for and against the State shall be taken (a) in the case of civil proceedings in the name of the Attorney General (b) in the case of criminal proceedings, in the name of the State.'

So the AG is doing what the Constitution now allows.

It is an office with heavy responsibilities requiring great care, diligence and of course, fairness. The AG, appointed by the PM, is a sworn member of cabinet and, according to the Westminster tradition, if he or she has a fundamental disagreement with cabinet, he or she must resign. The AG supports and advises the cabinet.

Now generally, apart from SC Armour, the matter of the 'independence' of the AG has attracted much attention, much of it calling for the 'depolitisation' of the office.

For example, the 1987 Hyatali Constitution Commission noted: 'The Attorney General is the only Minister specifically mentioned in the Constitution and his duties have raised the question whether they trespass upon or are in conflict with the duties or the independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions.'

A reasonable observation given what the Constitution states about the DPP: 'The Director of Public Prosecutions shall have power in any case in which he considers it fit and proper to do so (a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court…(b) to takeover and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by any other person or authority (c) to discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered in any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority.'

Apparently recognising possible 'trespassing,' the then government published a draft constitution (2006) stating the same DPP functions as in the current constitution but with a modification: 'The Director of Public Prosecutions shall discharge his functions under this Constitution and any other law under the general superintendence of the Attorney General.' How 'independent' would this make the DPP?

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