The point we are making, most respectfully, is that, once the statute confers a judicial function on a person, and in this case, section 396(7) of ACJA on a newly appointed justice of the Court of Appeal for a function that will be performed at the High Court, that judicial officer is for that purpose statutorily authorised to perform the function of the High Court judge.

The crux of the judgment is that section 396(7) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA), which allowed a High Court judge, who has just been newly elevated to the Court of Appeal, to return to conclude his part-heard criminal matters at the High Court, while also performing his functions as a justice of the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that a justice of the Court of Appeal is not a judge of the High Court, and therefore cannot sit as such a judge, and that a statute such as ACJA cannot confer on him powers that are absent in the constitutional provisions.

The Supreme Court found in this case that section 396(7) of ACJA contravenes section 290 of the Constitution, because it tries to give the powers of a High Court judge to a justice of the Court of Appeal, which is not given by the Constitution.

Section 396 (7) of ACJA provides thus:

"Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, a judge of the High Court who has been elevated to the Court of Appeal shall have dispensation to continue to sit as a High Court Judge only for the purpose of concluding any part heard criminal matter pending before him at the time of his elevation and shall conclude the same within a reasonable time: Provided that this subsection shall not prevent him from assuming duty as a justice of the Court of Appeal."