KEVAL MARIMUTHU
AT THE outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian intention was clear: take the capital, decapitate the head of the snake and its military command structure will crumble. The Russians, whether through bad military intelligence or just pure hubris, severely underestimated the resolve of the Ukrainian people. The disastrous attempted encirclement of Kyiv proves this. The Russians had less than 50,000 soldiers to pacify a city of over three million. You don't need to be a military expert to recognise that those numbers are simply inadequate.
It was a similar story in Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv. The Russians attempted blitzkrieg tactics to encircle major Ukrainian cities. Russia's lightning war failed for a few reasons. Its military transport and logistics network is mainly defensive and relies on the Russian railway system, making it hard to sustain front lines far beyond its borders.
'Combined arms' is the military doctrine of modern warfare: the air force, army, navy and special forces working in synergy towards a common goal. What we saw instead in the initial phase was a disjointed mess. The army acted without air support, limited collaboration between military arms, and inept politically-appointed generals operating as silos.
Russian military incompetence and corruption are well-documented phenomena and were on full display in the opening phase of this conflict. Trucks were left stranded in fields from collapsed tyre walls due to lack of maintenance, tanks abandoned for lack of fuel, and helicopter after helicopter shot down. At least four Russian generals are among the high-ranking military staff killed in action.
It quickly became apparent to the Russian military command that discontinuing their ambitious offensives was the best course of action. They withdrew from the north (Kyiv and Chernihiv) and made tactical retreats from the east and south (Kharkiv and Mykolaiv) to more defensible positions in Ukrainian territory.
The Russian supply lines were too long. The Russians failed to establish air superiority and the prospect of a devastating Ukrainian counterattack became a legitimate concern to the Kremlin. Most importantly, however, Russian manpower was then and still is now inefficient for multiple assaults over an expansive front line.
This retreat marked a new phase in the conflict. The Kremlin, recognising its initial failures, switched tactics and methods. Russia redeployed troops from northern Ukraine to its southern and eastern fronts. Then focused on establishing control over Ukraine's eastern industrial heartland: the Donbas region. As of August 9, Luhansk is under Russian occupation, and the majority of Donetsk has fallen to the invaders. These two regions make up the Donbas.
The lack of Russian manpower (terrain and fortifications also play a part) has restricted the Kremlin's ability to make large sweeping manoeuvres, forcing it to resort to brutally efficient grinding tactics. Ukrainian defensive positions along the front line are shelled daily by
