THE year 2020 was defined by the COVID-19 pandemic which left all segments of society in Africa affected. Some areas suffered more than others, but none have been spared. In the democracy and good governance space, analysts, civil society groups, donors, and implementers were worried that the onset of the pandemic would drive a rise in authoritarianism. Today, a year after the first case emerged, and despite some evidence that suggests authoritarian governments may have reduced civic and political space, one cannot ipso facto conclude that this is indeed so. Societal dynamics have certainly changed in many countries, but the evidence around the effects on democratic engagement is mixed. On one hand, authoritarian governments may have seized on the pandemic to tighten control of the civic space and freedom of expression. In some cases, public health measures enabled them to further restrict the ability of opposition candidates to engage citizens and mount effective campaigns. In Uganda, for instance, the government prevented Bobi Wine, a popular musician and charismatic opposition leader, from campaigning and performing, citing public health risks. Bobi Wine was eventually arrested for violating COVID-19 restrictions. The restrictions on Bobi Wine’s movement and actions, however, predated the advent of the pandemic. He had been detained several times in the past on different charges. In Guinea, where incumbent President Alpha Condé sought a controversial third term in a contentious election, the context unfolded differently. Because of social distancing and other prophylactic contingencies, voters were instructed to leave the polling station immediately after the vote. These measures undermined the credibility of the electoral process. It is standard practice for voters and party representatives to remain at the polling station and observe the vote counting. These measures did not only reduce the transparency of vote tabulation and transmission of results, they also benefited the incumbent. On the other hand, civil society and democracy actors have adjusted accordingly and found other avenues to further their engagement. Much has been said and written about digital democracy and how it may be the way of the future. COVID-19 has forced an acceleration and expansion of this trend. Civil society organisations and their partners have capitalised on technology and leveraged on digital platforms, such as Zoom, Teams, and others, to carry on their activities. In response to public health measures, they have moved their critical initiatives — that is, training workshops, rallies, and other gatherings — online where skilled trainers and facilitators now have access to higher numbers of participants. Online programming offers several advantages, including the transferability of content. Training can be portable and offshored if the local environment is particularly sensitive. Training materials can be more easily shared. With a few country exceptions, mainly in the Sahel and central Africa, there has been a seamless transition